https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Index ${session.getAttribute("locale")} 5 https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:45079 Wed 26 Oct 2022 14:53:16 AEDT ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:46330 Tue 15 Nov 2022 14:55:44 AEDT ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:35881 A secondary flight deck barrier is a lightweight device that is easy to deploy and stow, installed between the passenger cabin and the cockpit door that blocks access to the flight deck whenever the reinforced door is opened in flight for rest breaks, meals, etc. This will reduce the vulnerability of another 9/11 type attack in which an airliner is commandeered by terrorists, kept under control for some time, and then crashed into a specific target. Our risk-based framework is published in important, peer-reviewed journals: Risk Analysis and Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, and it was included in our 2018 book, How Safe is Safe Enough? Measuring and Assessing Aviation Security. We systematically and transparently apply standard risk-analytic and cost-benefit methods, ones that are routinely applied throughout the world. We use the standard definition of risk adopted by the DHS and TSA where the reduction in risk is the degree to which the security measure foils, deters, disrupts, or protects against a terrorist attack. A security measure is cost-effective when the benefit of the measure outweighs the costs of providing the security measures. Our results are based on robust systems reliability analysis and cost-benefit assessments. We find that secondary cockpit barriers are highly costeffective: Very effective: The secondary barrier reduces risk by up to 15%. Total risk reduction from all layers of aviation security then exceeds 99%. ; Modest cost of only $5 million per year for entire US commercial airline fleet. ; $10,000 each annualised for 6,000 aircraft over 15-20 year service life. ; Break-even analysis shows that even if there were only one terrorist hijacking attack in a thousand years (annual attack probability of 0.1%) and the terrorists arrived at the airport undeterred and undetected, secondary barriers would still be cost-effective. ; The benefit-to-cost ratio is a high 41 – $1 of cost buys $41 of benefit (lives saved, damage averted. ; Cost effective even if risk reduction is reduced by a factor of ten and costs quadruple.]]> Tue 07 Jan 2020 16:28:44 AEDT ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:41283 Thu 25 May 2023 09:41:22 AEST ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:47797 Thu 07 Dec 2023 10:36:52 AEDT ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:29280 Sat 24 Mar 2018 07:32:53 AEDT ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:43446 Mon 19 Sep 2022 14:51:23 AEST ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:42161 Fri 26 Aug 2022 07:50:35 AEST ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:41297 Fri 23 Jun 2023 09:32:38 AEST ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:40420 Fri 22 Jul 2022 14:02:24 AEST ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:38590 -2 to 1 x 10^-5 for explosive ordnance and terrorism blast scenarios. This provides a reasonable margin of safety against major structural damage. It was also found that the risk reducing benefit of blast-resistant UHPC columns can be considerable.]]> Fri 12 Nov 2021 16:20:29 AEDT ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:49184 Fri 05 May 2023 15:45:17 AEST ]]> https://ogma.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/ /manager/Repository/uon:42784 Fri 02 Sep 2022 13:34:36 AEST ]]>